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Abstract
When jurors decide whether a putative patent infringer is liable under the doctrine of
equivalents, Federal Circuit law requires that the patent owner's trial presentation provide
'particularized evidence" and "linking argument" with respect to each prong of the classic
tripartite test for liability (i.e.,
substantial identity of "function," "way," and "result" between
each element of the claimed invention and accused device). The court has recognized that absent
such evidentiary roadmapping, jurors are "put to sea without guiding charts." In its August 2001
decision in Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen PlantScience, Inc., the Federal Circuit refused to extend
this same evidentiary framework to an accused infringer's affirmative defense that the patent in
suit was invalid for prior invention under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). This article contends that the
Federal Circuit in Monsanto improvidently deprived jurors of analytical guideposts that are
essential to the kind of fully informed fact-finding that should underlie any verdict on the
validity or invalidity of an issued patent. The article proposes that the evidentiary requirements
for contextualization, particularization, and application of pertinent facts to applicable law, as

previously required for liability determinations under the doctrine of equivalents, should
likewise be mandated for all cases in which patent validity is challenged before a jury. The jury's
deliberational task is no less complex in the validity phase of a patent trial than in the liability
phase, and is further informed by the presumption of validity that attaches to issued patents.
The risks of juror error that warrant imposition of particularized evidentiary requirements for
liability determination are even more potent in the validity setting, for a jury's decision to
sustain or invalidate an asserted patent affects not only the parties to the lawsuit but also the
public at large. In keeping with its mandate to enhance predictability and uniformity in patent
disputes, the Federal Circuit has the power and the responsibility to improve patent jury trial
practice by requiring that validity challenges be tried under the same evidentiary ground-rules
as those that the court has already established for equivalents liability.
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AT SEA IN A BLACK Box:
CHARTING A CLEARER COURSE FOR JURIES THROUGH THE
PERILOUS STRAITS OF PATENT INVALIDITY
JANICE M. MUELLER*

Jurors are key players in the complex, high-stakes battleground of U.S. patent
infringement litigation.1 When a jury is charged with resolving the sophisticated
question of a defendant's liability for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
the Federal Circuit wisely requires that the patentee (who carries the burden of proof
on this issue) present "particularized testimony" on each of the "function," "way," and
"result" elements of the classic Graver Tank2 tripartite test for equivalents
infringement. 3 The patentee must also provide the jury with "linking argument" that
ties this evidence to each of the three elements. 4
By requiring this degree of
contextualization and particularity in the evidentiary presentation of a liability
theory whose imprecise boundaries have been the subject of debate for over 100
years, 5 the Federal Circuit has injected a much-needed safeguard into a juror
decisional process that has been criticized as uncertain, unpredictable, and virtually
unreviewable.6
*Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. E-mail:
7mueller@jmls.edu. I thank Ken Kandaras, Walter Kendall, Kimberly Moore, Bill Rooklidge, and
Richard Stanley for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
I See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An EmpiricalPeek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366 n.7 (2000) (reporting that in 1998, 60% of all patent trials (62
out of 103) were tried before juries) (citing ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., JUD. BUS. U.S. CTS. 167 tbl. C4
(1998)). For 1999, the percentage of patent jury trials rose to 62% (61 out of 98). See id. (citing
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., JUD. Bus. U.S. CTS. 161 tbl. C4 (1999)).
2 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (stating that,
in order to '[temper
unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of an
invention," a patentee may proceed against an accused device even though it does not literally
infringe "if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result") (citations omitted).
3 See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In Texas
Instruments Inc. v.Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the Federal Circuit
made clear that Lear Siegeis "particularized evidence'/"linking argument" requirement still
applies even after the Federal Circuit's clarification in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-donkinson
Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997), that Graver
Tank's "function," "way" and "result" trilogy is not the sole test for equivalency, but rather merely
one way of establishing the ultimate question of the "insubstantiality of the differences" between
each element of the claimed and accused devices. See Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1566-67.
See Lear Siegler,873 F.2d at 1426.
See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001); Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950);
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853). See generally Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Role and
Responsibility of Patent Attorneys in Improving the Doctrine of Equivalents, 40 IDEA 123 (2000)
(characterizing the doctrine of equivalents as "the most difficult and least predictable of all doctrines
in patent law to apply").
GFor criticisms of juries in patent litigation, see Moore, supranote 1, at 365 (noting "increasing
skepticism regarding the role of juries in patent cases"); id. at 365 n.2 (collecting numerous
secondary authorities critical of jury's role in patent litigation); id. (citing In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d
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Regrettably, the Federal Circuit refuses to forge the same requirement of precise
evidentiary presentation in jury trials of patent invalidity based on prior
inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2), 7 a determination arguably just as complex
as an analysis of infringement and demanding a greater burden of proof.8

In its

August 16, 2001 decision in Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Science, Inc., 9 the
Federal Circuit declined to extend the "particularized testimony"/"linking argument"
requirement to a case in which it held that a jury had properly invalidated the
Monsanto patent in suit10 under a § 102(g)(2) theory of earlier conception of the same
invention by scientists of non-party Agracetus Corporation, coupled with diligence by
Agracetus during the relevant period of time leading up to reduction to practice of the
invention. 11 The Federal Circuit affirmed the patent's invalidation based on the
jury's verdict, despite the fact that defendant/accused infringer Mycogen never
966, 980-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (asserting that
"[n]o more important nor contentious an issue arises in patent law jurisprudence than the
appropriate role of juries in patent litigation"), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995)).
With regard to the virtual unreviewability of jury verdicts in patent cases, see, for example,
McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Michel, J., dissenting)
(seeing in majority's opinion, which sustained jury's verdict that claimed invention marketed as
"Roger Clemens Instructional Baseball" would not have been obvious, an implication that "a general
jury verdict on the legal question of obviousness is essentially immune from review by the trial court
on JMOL, or by [the Federal Circuit] on appeal."); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
62 F.3d 1512, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en ban) (Plager, J., dissenting) (characterizing appellate
review of doctrine of equivalents cases as "largely pro forma," and noting that such cases typically
come to Federal Circuit "with nothing more than a general verdict finding infringement" providing
"no explanation by the jury of the rationale behind their verdict, if any exist"), reversed,520 U.S. 17
(1997); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that a general
verdict "involves a presumption that the jury found the facts and reached the legal conclusions
undergirding its verdict. That practice leaving a wide area of uncertainty on review, appellate
judges have expressed grave concern over use of the general verdict in civil cases.").
7 Section 102(g)(2) of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.(2001), provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . .before such person's invention
thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention
under this subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of
conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable
diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a
time prior to conception by the other.
s The burden of proof borne by an accused infringer seeking to invalidate a patent, which is
presumptively valid, see 35 U.S.C. § 282, is "clear and convincing" evidence. See Monsanto Co. v.
Mycogen Plant Science, Inc., 261 F.3d 1356, 1362. In contrast, the patent owner seeking to establish
infringement bears the lesser "preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof. See SSIH Equip. SA
v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
"Priority of invention is a question of law based on underlying factual determinations."

Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1362.
9 Monsanto, 261 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

10 Monsanto's U.S. Patent No. 5,500,365 was directed to genetically altered plants having
heightened insecticidal resistance.
See Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1359. In accordance with the
invention, the genetic material of the plants was modified so as to achieve better levels of expression
of the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) protein, which is toxic to various insects. See id.
11 See id. at 1359, 1361. The Federal Circuit explained that the earlier conception plus
diligence theory had to be the basis for the jury's verdict, because the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict under the alternate theory of an earlier reduction to practice by Agracetus. See
id. at 1361-62.
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explicitly informed the jury that it could prevail under such a theory; 12 the earlier13
conception-plus-diligence theory was set forth only in the jury instructions.
The district court had denied patentee Monsanto's motion for judgment as a
matter of law ("JMOL"), determining that the record contained the "substantial
15
14
required to support the jury's presumed
evidence" quantum of evidence
underlying fact finding of "reasonable diligence." 16 Although never explained to the
17
jury, Agracetus's lab notebooks were introduced into evidence at the close of trial,
and the jury heard a conclusory statement in deposition testimony that Agracetus
had made "reasonable efforts" during the relevant time period to create and test the
invention. 18
12

See id. at 1363. The court stated that:
[i]t is undisputed that the defendants tried the case principally on the theory that
Agracetus both conceived the invention prior to Monsanto and reduced it to
practice before Monsanto, and that the defendants did not explicitly inform the
jury that the defendants should prevail under the theory of an earlier conception
coupled with diligence.

Id.
13Soo id. (noting that "the jury was read proper instructions on establishing prior invention by
an earlier conception coupled with diligence").
11"Substantial evidence" has been defined as "such relevant evidence from the record taken as
a whole as might be accepted by a reasonable mind as adequate to support the finding under
review." Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1, The fact-finding was presumed because the jury rendered only a general verdict of invalidity
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). Soo Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1361 (explaining that jury "did not make
any specific findings regarding conception, diligence, or reduction to practice").
16Soo id. at 1361-62; Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Science, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 133, 152-53
(D. Del. 1999).
17 The district court's opinion lists a number of discrete laboratory notebook entries, each made
by Agracetus scientists during the relevant time period from just before September 8, 1987 until
mid-August 1988, as "significant dates and evidence of diligence":
October 20, 1987 - AMVBt2 construct made by Barton.
November 2, 1987 - AMVBt3 construct made by Barton.
January 15, 1988 - AMVBt4 construct made by Barton.
Mid-January, 1988 - Transformation experiments conducted by Cannon.
May 2326, 1988 - Tobacco hornworm bioassays conducted by Cannon.
June 3, 1988 - Cannon enters data in her laboratory notebook.
June & July 1988 - Additional bioassays conducted by Cannon.
August 11,1988 - Western blot tests conducted by Miller.
Monsanto, 61 F. Supp. 2d 133, 185 (D. Del. 1999).
Based on these and other unspecified notebook entries, see id. (referring generally to "entries
[made] in each of the following months: August, September, October, November and December 1987
and January 1988"), the district court concluded that "there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis
for a reasonable jury to find that [Agracetus scientists] Barton and Miller were the first to conceive
of the invention, and then exercised reasonable diligence in reducing that invention to practice." Id.
Accordingly, the district court concluded that the record provided "legally sufficient evidence to
support the jury's finding that Claims 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the '365 patent are invalid by prior
invention." Id.
Before the Federal Circuit, Monsanto argued that the defendants' "failure to provide argument
or testimony that both explained the evidence and showed how it supported a diligence theory
foreclosed the jury from relying on that theory." Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1363. Monsanto also alleged
that it was prejudiced because the defendants' failure to explicitly raise the diligence theory
deprived Monsanto of an opportunity to rebut it. Id. As explained infra, the Federal Circuit rejected
both of these arguments.
18 As reproduced in the district court's opinion sustaining the jury verdict of invalidity, the
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Despite the relative paucity of competent evidence on reasonable diligence, the
Federal Circuit sided with the district court and concluded that substantial evidence
supported the Monsanto jury's presumed findings on diligence-presumed because
the jury rendered only a general verdict of invalidity under Section 102(g).19 "The
evidence is sufficient, despite the absence of argument or testimony explaining the
lab notebooks and linking their contents to the elements of diligence, to support
presumed jury findings that Agracetus was diligent throughout the entire critical
period," 20 the Federal Circuit found.
But such a cursory, unexplained, and non-contextualized presentation of
technical evidence to a jury of laypersons, in support of a non-explicated legal theory
of invalidation that turns on the proper application of patent law terms of art such as
"conception" and "reasonable diligence," is a precariously slender reed on which to
strip a patentee of its valuable property right. The most troubling aspect of the
evidentiary presentation to the Monsanto jury is not its lack of quantum (although
this itself is questionable), but rather its lack of quality. Even assuming that the
requisite quantum of evidence required under the "substantial evidence"/"reasonable
jury" standard to sustain the jury's presumed findings was present in the record,
there is no basis for presuming that the Monsanto jury arrived at its verdict through
a reasoned, rational analysis that correctly applied the law to the facts. Other than
the jury instructions read to them at the close of trial, there is no reason to presume
that the jury understood what the "the law" on reasonable diligence is, much less
properly applied it to completely unexplained evidence like the cryptic Agracetus
laboratory notebook entries. 21 Nor was there any meaningful opportunity for
Monsanto to defend against an invalidity theory never explicitly stated at trial.
From all indications, the Monsanto jury was "put to sea without guiding
charts," 22 and the virtual unreviewability of its "black box" verdict ensured that the
lack of guidance at trial could not be remedied on appeal. The "black box" metaphor,
previously coined to criticize the use of general jury verdicts, 2 3 is doubly appropriate

entirety of this deposition testimony was as follows:
Q. Between August 24, 1987 and this insect bioassay worm feeding 56 [in May
1988], did Ken Barton or you or someone under the supervision of Ken Barton or
you make reasonable efforts toward obtaining transformed plants expressing Bt4?
A. Yes, we did.
Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Science, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 133, 184 (D. Del. 1999). As
the district court itself recognized, "[s]uch generalized statements do not satisfy diligence
requirements." Id. (citing Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 386 (CCPA 1977)).
19See Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1361 (noting that the jury "did not make any specific findings
regarding conception, diligence, or reduction to practice"); id. at 1362 (explaining that "the district
court had only the jury's verdict of prior inventorship without any specific findings of underlying
facts," and that "[iln such circumstances, factual findings in support of the prior inventorship verdict
are presumed to have been made by the jury").
20 Id. at 1370.
21 See upra note 17.
22 Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
23 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997)
(noting "the concern over unreviewability due to black-box jury verdicts"); In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d
966, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies., J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (contending that
'[a] s jury cases are now tried, in accordance with our precedent, the evidence respecting validity of a
patent is thrown into the black box of the jury room, and the verdict is returned either valid or
invalid"), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995); Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d
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here where the jury was provided virtually no illumination of the analytical path by
which it was to decide the question of prior invention. The lack of any explanatory
testimony concerning the Agracetus laboratory notebooks, or linking argument that
showed the jury how the notebook entries might amount to "reasonable diligence," as
that term has been defined by case law, ensured that the jury rendered its verdict in
virtual darkness. The Monsanto jury operated within the confines of a "black box"
that permitted no light to intrude upon the deliberational process, just as it
prevented any meaningful review of the verdict because of the liberal "substantial
evidence" standard of review. Both the inputs and outputs of the jury process were
shrouded in darkness.
The Federal Circuit in Monsanto rejected adoption of a "particularized
testimony"/"linking argument" requirement for § 102(g)(2) invalidity defenses, in
large part because in prior Federal Circuit cases such a requirement has only been
explicitly adopted in respect of doctrine of equivalents determinations. "[T]here is no
general requirement that a party necessarily provide explanatory argument linking
the evidence to each of the various elements of a legal theory,"24 the court proclaimed.
But the Monsanto court's conclusion that a linking argument requirement is "the
exception and not the rule"25 for patent trials under current Federal Circuit

precedent begs the larger policy question: to enhance reliability and predictability of
the jury trial process in patent cases, why should the "particularized
testimony"/"linking argument" requirement be limited to the sole issue of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents? Are not many aspects of patent
litigation equally, if not more complex and fraught with risk of error, particularly
those such as invalidity defenses where the evidentiary quantum required for
invalidation is "clear and convincing" evidence?
I contend that an explicit "particularized evidence"/"linking argument"
requirement makes good sense for all invalidity defenses litigated in patent jury
trials. The heightened "clear and convincing" burden of proof to invalidate a
presumptively valid issued patent 26 justifies a more particularized evidentiary
presentation, just as such a presentation is justified in the equivalents infringement
context where enhanced procedural cautions are appropriate because a patentee's
exclusionary right may be extended beyond the literal scope of its claims. Moreover,
heightened evidentiary requirements are appropriate for jury trials of patent validity
because the validity (or invalidity) of a patent impacts society at large, not just the
parties to the lawsuit as in an infringement determination.
The equal analytical complexity of both the infringement and invalidity
determinations also justifies extending the "particularized evidence"/"linking
argument" requirement to invalidity defenses. Just as the legal rule for establishing
liability under the doctrine of equivalents involves satisfaction of multiple elements,
so too do most invalidity defenses. The Supreme Court has delineated these
elements for several invalidity defenses. Where the Court has not yet done so, the

707, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (recognizing that "[c]oncerns have been expressed by the patent bar that a
jury trial creates a black box into which patents are thrown and emerge intact or invalid by an

unknown and unknowable process").
24 Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1367.
25_Id.
26 See

id. at 1362.
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Federal Circuit or its predecessor the CCPA have, as discussed infra.
Establishing a requirement of "particularized testimony"/"linking argument" for
invalidity defenses tried before juries is within the Federal Circuit's mandate, and in
line with the court's mission of enhancing predictability and uniformity in patent
law. 27 Because a "particularlized testimony"/"linking argument" requirement has
already been required by the Federal Circuit since 1984 in one aspect of patent
litigation without objection by the Supreme Court, 28 such a requirement can be seen
as within the Circuit's "special expertise" in patent matters to which the Supreme
29
Court defers.
A uniform linking argument requirement is also consistent with the type of
particularized guidance suggested by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson to
remedy the patent jury "black box" problem; there the Court specifically suggested
greater use of special verdicts and interrogatories in patent jury trials, but left in the
Federal Circuit's hands the broader question of "how best to implement procedural
improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the
law." 30

Nothing in

Warner-Jenkinson suggests that extending a "particularized

evidence"/"linking argument" requirement to invalidity defenses would unreasonably
restrain a litigant's Seventh Amendment jury trial rights, and the Federal Circuit
31
has never questioned the application of such requirements on that basis.

By declining the opportunity offered in Monsanto to expand the "particularized
evidence"/"linking argument" requirements to invalidity defenses, the Federal Circuit
squandered a chance to provide much-needed ground rules for patent jury trials. In
so doing, the court sanctioned invalidation of patents under any statutorily-based
theory so long as that theory is cursorily mentioned in the jury instructions, and the
requisite "substantial evidence" is present somewhere in the evidentiary record.
Whether the jury had any understanding of what the evidence meant and how to
apply the law to the evidence is now moot. Monsanto not only illustrates the
affirmance of a jury verdict that was likely reached by jurors who had no meaningful
understanding of their analytical task; it virtually guarantees that same result will
follow in future jury trials of invalidity. The Federal Circuit has the authority and
the responsibility to rectify this aspect of patent jury trials, and there are compelling
27 A primary objective underlying the Federal Circuit's formation in 1982 was to "increase
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law." Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d
1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting S. Rep. 97-975, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprintedin 1982 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 15) (legislative history of Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982).
28 The Federal Circuit denied rehearing in Lear Siegler, see Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy
Mattress Co., No. 88-1540, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 8485 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 1989), and no petition for
certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court. The Nestier and Lear Siegler requirements for
"particularized evidence" and "linking argument" in the doctrine of equivalents context are still good
law in the Federal Circuit. See Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
29 Cf Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (leaving to
Federal Circuit's "sound judgment in this area of its special expertise" the refinement of tests for
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).

'30
-d. at 39 n.8.
'3'One

judge of the Federal Circuit has criticized the "particularized evidence"/"linking

argument" requirement for doctrine of equivalents cases as "paternalistic" and one which "diverts

patent jury trials from the mainstream of the law." Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d
1320, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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reasons why the court should do so.

THE GENESIS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
"PARTICULARIZED EVIDENCE"/"LINKING ARGUMENT" REQUIREMENT

In its 1984 Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp. decision, 32 a five-judge panel33 of the
Federal Circuit affirmed a trial court's refusal to instruct a jury on infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents when the patentee's trial presentation was clearly
limited to a theory of literal infringement. No "way" evidence of equivalency was
ever presented, the Federal Circuit observed,3 4 and the plaintiffs technical expert
35
witness specifically disclaimed any reliance on a doctrine of equivalents theory.
The Nestier court searched the record for evidence that the patentee had placed the
doctrine of equivalents theory "in context" for the jury, but found none:
At no time did Nestier's attorneys or witnesses present evidence
which was explicitly related to the jury in the Graver Tank terms of
equivalence of functions, means, and result. Analysis of equivalence
involves those three factors, and a jury cannot be expected to be able
to make any such determination absent evidence and argument
concerning the doctrine and each of its elements ....

This is not to say

that the exact Graver Tank language must be used by attorneys and
witnesses. However, appellant, which bore the burden of proving
infringement, had the responsibility of establishing that context at
trial and of stating its case within that context-but it failed to do
SO.

36

The trial court's refusal to instruct on the doctrine of equivalents was proper, the
Circuit concluded, because .'[iun a jury trial, a court should not instruct on a
37
proposition of law about which there is no competent evidence."'
Five years later, the Federal Circuit in Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co.38

32

739 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

33 Although appeals to the Federal Circuit are typically heard by panels of three judges, in

some instances the court has heard cases in panels of five judges. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Nastior,739 F.2d at 1576; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1983). This
practice is likely a holdover from one of the Federal Circuit's predecessor courts, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, which always sat as an en bane court of five judges. See In re Gosteli,
872 F.2d 1008, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Title 28, U.S.C., specifically authorizes the Federal Circuit's
expanded-panel practice. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2001) (stating that "[c]ases and controversies shall
be heard and determined by a court or panel of not more than three judges (except that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may sit in panels of more than three judges if its
rules so provide")).
34 See Nestler, 739 F.2d at 1580 (noting "absence of any such evidence concerning equivalence
of means").
'
See id. at 1580.
36 Id. at 1579.
'37Id. (quoting Jackson v. Southern Railway Co., 317 F.2d 532, 537 (5th Cir. 1963)).
38 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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dramatically reinforced Nestiels requirement for proper contextualization of a
doctrine of equivalents theory of infringement liability. Reversing a $2.8 million jury
verdict of infringement under the doctrine, the Federal Circuit held that without an
explicit showing of how the patentee compares the function, way and result of each
element of the claimed and accused devices, "a jury is more or less put to sea without
guiding charts" when called upon to determine infringement under the doctrine of
39
equivalents.
Admittedly, the patentee in Lear Siegler came much closer towards putting a
doctrine of equivalents theory before the jury than in Nestier; the Lear Siegler jury
was specifically instructed on the doctrine, after hearing closing argument in which
the patentee's counsel pointed the jury to testimony elicited on cross-examination of
the defendant's technical expert as "ha[ving] to do with equivalents." 40 Nevertheless,
whether or not the expert's testimony on equivalence contained "sufficient probative
force,"' 41 the Federal Circuit concluded that it was fatally deficient for failure of
explication as to all three Graver Tank factors. 42 The Lear Siegler court declared its
support for "the ability of a jury to decide the factual issue of equivalence," but made
it crystal clear that "to enable the jury to use its ability, Nestier requires that the
three Graver Tank elements must be presented in the form of particularized
43
testimony and linking argument."
Subsequent Federal Circuit decisions continue to enforce the Nestier/Lear
Siegler requirements in doctrine of equivalents infringement cases. For example, the
Federal Circuit majority in Malta v. Sehulmerieh Cari]ons,Inc., 44 affirmed a trial
court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") to the accused
infringer because it concluded that the patentee had failed to present sufficient
evidence of function, way and result to the jury in accordance with Nestier and Lear
Siegler.45
Concurring Judge Michel highlighted the need for an explicated
presentation of evidence, even where jury instructions are not challenged:
That the instructions did not contain erroneous statements of
law, were reasonably comprehensive, and went unchallenged is
immaterial ....
...Lear Siegler is based on the very premise that sufficiency of
instructions cannot cure an insufficiency of proof as to the three
Graver Tank requirements. The reason we do not allow curing by
instructions is that even with perfect jury instructions, determining
'39
Id. at
40 Id. at
41Id.
12 See

1425-26.

1426.

id. at 1427.

43Lear Siegler, 873 F.2d at 1426.

11 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
, See id. at 1327. The Malta court explained that:
[w]hile Lear Siegler does not go so far as to require recitation of the magic words
'function', 'way', and 'result', we think that it at least requires the evidence to
establish what the function, way, and result of both the claimed device and the
accused device are, and why those functions, ways, and results are substantially
the same.
Id. at 1327 n.5.
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infringement by equivalents would still be guesswork for a jury
unless it is given separate, explicit and substantial evidence of
46
comparison as to each requirement of Graver Tank.
In Texas InstrumentsInc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,47 the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed that the "particularized evidence"/"linking argument" requirement was
still good law even after the Circuit's clarification in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co.48 that Graver Tank's "function," "way" and "result" trilogy is
not the sole test for equivalency, but rather merely one way of establishing the
49
ultimate question of the "insubstantiality of the differences":
Pursuant to our precedent, a patentee must still provide
particularized testimony and linking argument as to the
"insubstantiality of the differences" between the claimed invention
and the accused device or process, or with respect to the function,
way, result test when such evidence is presented to support a finding
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Such evidence
must be presented on a limitation-by-limitation basis. Generalized
testimony as to the overall similarity between the claims and the
50
accused infringer's product or process will not suffice.
Most recently, the Federal Circuit in Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris
Corp.51 summarized the thrust of the Nestier/Lear Siegler line of cases as "ensur[ing]
that a jury is provided with the proper evidentiary foundation from which it may
52
permissibly conclude that a claim limitation has been met by an equivalent."
In view of this line of authority, the Monsanto opinion is literally correct in
stating that the Federal Circuit explicitly requires "particularized evidence" and
"linking argument" in only one aspect of patent jury trials-assertions of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. But that statement disregards the
reality that for all practical purposes, the Federal Circuit already requires the same
degree of evidentiary particularization and contextualization with respect to the
defense of invalidity based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, an issue frequently
tried to juries.

53

16 Id. at 1330 (Michel, J., concurring).
47 90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
48 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'don othergrounds,520 U.S. 17 (1997).
49 See id. at 1518-19.
,o0Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1567.
.,' 156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
52 Id. at 1188.
53 For example, in Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court
established that it is not legal error to submit the ultimate legal question of obviousness to a jury,
provided that proper procedures are followed to ensure that the jury's analysis proceeds in
accordance with the Graham factors. See id. at 1547. The Connell court emphasized that "the trier
of fact must answer the [Graham] factual inquiries" and suggested that "[s]ubmission of the
obviousness question to the jury should . . . be accompanied by detailed special interrogatories
designed to elicit responses to at least all the factual inquiries enumerated in Graham . . . based on
the presentations made in the particular trial." Id. Although the court in RailroadDynamics, Inc.
v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1984), subsequently clarified that "[f]ailure to submit
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Thus, explicitly
extending
the
Nestier/Lear Siegler "particularized
evidence"/"linking argument" requirement to all invalidity defenses in jury trials as
proposed herein would not represent a quantum leap beyond existing precedent. The
ultimate goal is the same in either case: to ensure that before juries render verdicts
on complex questions of patent law, whether involving infringement liability or
patent invalidity, they are given appropriate guidance-the necessary navigational
"charts," to use Lear Siegleis metaphor-in an attempt to increase the reliability of
their verdict and to facilitate its meaningful review on appeal.

COMPARING JUROR ANALYTICAL TASKS: DETERMINING PATENT INVALIDITY VERSUS
DETERMINING INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The Monsanto court rejected application of a "particularized evidence"/"linking
argument" requirement to the § 102(g)(2) invalidity defense raised by
defendant/accused infringer Mycogen. Invalidity can be established under this
statutory provision by one of two ways. The defendant can show that the named
inventor was not the first inventor of the patented invention by establishing either
that (1) someone other than the named inventor reduced the invention to practice in
the U.S. before the named inventor did, and did not thereafter abandon, suppress, or
conceal the invention; or (2) someone other than the named inventor conceived the
invention before the named inventor did, and that person diligently worked towards
reducing the invention to practice throughout the time period that extends from just
before the named inventor's conception date to the other person's reduction to
practice date. 54 Because the evidence was insufficient in quantum to support
Mycogen's principal theory 55 of an earlier reduction to practice by Agracetus, 56 the
detailed fact interrogatories [on each Graham factor] will not in every case result in the need for a
new trial," id. at 1517, it viewed the practice as "nonetheless strongly recommended as an
appropriate means of guiding a jury, increasing the reliability of its verdict, and facilitating the
judicial role following a jury trial." Id. See also Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (explaining that "[w]hen the Graham factual underpinnings have been genuinely disputed...
we presume that the jury resolved them in favor of the verdict winner"). Cf Ruiz v.A.B. Chance
Co., 234 F.3d 654 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding in bench trial that district court reversibly erred by
failing to make findings on each Graham factor).
, Soo Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1361-62, 1362-63; Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
55 See Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1363 (referring to earlier reduction to practice theory as the
theory that "defendants tried the case principally on").
' Soo id. at 1363 (stating that "[ilt
is undisputed that the defendants tried the case principally
on the theory that Agracetus both conceived the invention prior to Monsanto and reduced it to
practice before Monsanto, and that the defendants did not explicitly inform the jury that the
defendants should prevail under the theory of an earlier conception coupled with diligence"); id. at
1361-62 (explaining that given jury's general verdict of invalidity under Section 102(g)(2), district
court "worked through the possible scenarios that could justify the jury's verdict" and found the
evidence insufficient under the "reasonable jury" standard to support earlier reduction to practice,
but sufficient to support earlier conception coupled with diligence). See also Monsanto Co. v.
Mycogen Plant Science, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 133, 183 (D. Del. 1999) (concluding that record did not
provide legally sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Agracetus's scientists reduced
the invention to practice before Monsanto's scientists did); id. at 185 (concluding that record did
provide legally sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Agracetus's scientists were first
to conceive the invention and then exercised reasonable diligence in reducing that invention to
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only other theory on which the defendants could prevail was one of prior invention
based on earlier conception by Agracetus coupled with Agracetus' reasonable
diligence linking the conception to its later reduction to practice.
In rejecting the patentee Monsanto's charge that the defendant had not
sufficiently explicated this latter theory for the jury, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged that determining diligence can be "complex," but opined that "it is not
fraught with the same problems as a function-way-result inquiry," 57 which was at
issue in Nestier/Lear Siegler. The court justified its less-rigorous treatment of the
evidentiary presentation necessary to place defendant Mycogen's § 102(g)(2)
invalidity defense before the jury on three primary grounds: (1) the Supreme Court
has not identified any separate sub-elements of diligence, as it has with respect to
the Graver Tank equivalency test;58 (2) there is no risk analogous to the concern in
doctrine of equivalents cases that the jury will merely look to "overall similarity"
rather than considering equivalency by separately analyzing each of the function,
way and result elements of Graver Tank;59 and (3) "diligence" in the § 102(g)(2)
context requires "reasonable diligence," and determining "reasonableness" is a
"standard task" for juries that does not justify imposition of an additional
60
requirement for particularized evidence and linking argument.

(1) Sub-elements of diligence
None of these three justifications withstands close scrutiny. First, the Monsanto
court's assertion that the Supreme Court has not identified any separate subelements of diligence is an over-simplification of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
on prior invention based on conception coupled with diligence. Even if the Supreme
Court has not issued any Graver Tank-style opinion in which it separately lists subelements for establishing diligence, it has certainly explored in considerable detail
the evidentiary contours of what is required to meet the reasonable diligence
requirement. 61 The Supreme Court has also cited with approval 62 the early "leading
practice).
57

oS

Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1367.
See id.

9 See id.

60 See id.
6;1Philadelphiaand Trenton R.R. Co. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. 448 (1840), appears to be the earliest
Supreme Court case alluding to the possibility of prior invention based on earlier conception plus
diligence, rather than earlier reduction to practice. In that case Justice Story affirmed the lower
court's admission of rebuttal evidence presented by the plaintiff to establish an invention date prior
to the date of his patent:
In many cases of inventions, it is hardly possible in any other manner to ascertain
the precise time and exact origin of the particular invention. The invention itself
is an intellectual process or operation; and, like all other expressions of thought,
can in many cases scarcely be made known, except by speech. The invention may
be consummated and perfect, and may be susceptible of complete description in
words, a month, or even a year before it can be embodied in any visible form,
machine, or composition of matter. ...
But his conversations and declarations,
stating that he had made an invention, and describing its details and explaining
its operations, are properly to be deemed an assertion of his right, at that time, as
an inventor to the extent of the facts and details which he then makes known;
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decision" 63 of Christie v. Seybold,64 in which then-Sixth Circuit Judge Taft (later
President and Supreme Court Justice Taft) noted in 1893 that "t]he question of
reasonable diligence in any case depends . . . upon all the circumstances." 65 What is
"reasonable" requires distinguishing between "due diligence" and "temporary
abandonment" of the invention,6 6 the Sixth Circuit explained, and may involve
considerations of the invention's complexity as well as excuses for inactivity such as
67
an inventor's health, his finances, and his work on other inventions.
In addition to Supreme Court decisions, a wealth of more recent CCPA, regional
circuit, Federal Circuit, and Patent Office Board of Appeals and Interferences
decisions have elucidated a number of criteria for what constitutes "reasonable
diligence." 68 Reasonable diligence must be continuous over the entire relevant time
period, and must involve either activity towards reduction to practice, or reasonable
excuse for inactivity during gaps. 69 Professor Chisum summarizes the law in this
area by stating that "[tihere are no hard and fast rules on diligence, but a number of
factors or excuses recur," 70 including commercial exploitation, poverty or illness,
employment, doubts about value or feasability, patent attorney workload, work on

although not of their existence at an antecedent time.
In short, such
conversations and declarations, coupled with a description of the nature and
objects of the invention, are to be deemed a part of the res gestae; and legitimate
evidence that the invention was then known to and claimed by him, and thus its
origin may he fixed at least as early as that period.
Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
In Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (1943), the Supreme
Court upheld the Court of Claims' invalidation of Marconi's U.S. Patent No. 763,772, issued in 1904
and directed to improvements in wireless telegraphy, based on prior conception coupled with
diligence by one Stone, a rival inventor. The record contained "convincing proof' of Stone's earlier
conception, the Court found. Id. at 34. Moreover, the Court explained, "[t]o obtain the benefit of his
prior conception, the inventor must not abandon his invention, Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 481,
but must proceed with diligence to reduce it to practice." Id. at 35. Reviewing in detail the evidence,
which included Stone's disclosures in letters to other inventors, Stone's description of the invention
to his class at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and delays occasioned by Stone's efforts to
obtain financial backing and capital funding, see id. at 32-35, the Supreme Court concluded that
"[w]e think Stone has shown the necessary diligence." id. at 35.
62 See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34 (1943) (citing
Christie v. Seybold, 55 F. 69 (6th Cir. 1893), as among the several cases by which "[i]t is well
established that as between two inventors priority of invention will be awarded to the one who by
satisfying proof can show that he first conceived of the invention").
(33DONALD S. CHISUM, 3-CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.02[3] [b] (2001).
64 55 F. 69 (6th Cir. 1893).
U, Id. at 77. More recently, the Federal Circuit has characterized the reasonable diligence
inquiry as one involving a "rule of reason" approach, to be determined based on the particular
circumstances of each case. See Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024, 1028 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
66 See Christie, 55 F. at 69.
(37See id.
68 See generallyCHISUM, supra note 63, at § 10.07 (summarizing cases).
69 See Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that "Griffith must
account for the entire period from just before Kanamaru's filing date until his reduction to
practice"); see also Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 385 n.5 (CCPA 1977) (explaining that "reasonable
diligence" requirement of § 102(g) is founded on public policy that favors the early disclosure of
inventions, similarly to requirement that there be no unreasonable delay in filing patent application
following an actual reduction to practice so as to avoid holding of suppression or concealment).
70 See CHISUM, supra note 63, at § 10.07[4].
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71

other inventions.
Perhaps most importantly with respect to the issues in Monsanto, the law is
clear that testimony presented to establish diligence must be corroborated and it
must be definite. 72 General allegations that efforts continued during a particular
time period are insufficient; the evidence of diligence must be definite as to dates and
73
facts.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the "reasonable diligence" concept
does not involve any identifiably separate "elements," the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit have made clear that many other invalidity defenses do. Thus, the
Monsanto court's first justification for departing from a "particularized
evidence"/"linking argument" requirement would not be supportable when extended
to other invalidity defenses, as proposed herein.
Separate elements have been identified for at least the § 102(b) loss of right, §
103 obviousness, and § 112,
1 non-enablement invalidity defenses. For example,
the Supreme Court, in Pfaffv. Wells Elees., Inc., 74 recently decreed that to invalidate
a patent on the ground that the claimed invention was placed on sale within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the challenger of validity must establish that prior to
the critical date, (1) the patentee's product was the subject of a commercial offer for
sale and (2) that the invention was "ready for patenting." 75 In Graham v. John Deere
Co.,7 6 the Court mandated that analysis of the legal conclusion of non-obviousness
77
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 must involve consideration of the "basic factual inquiries" of
(1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the differences between the prior art and
the claimed invention, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art, and (4) so-called
"secondary considerations."7 8 The Federal Circuit in In re Wands7 9 specified a
number of factors for analyzing during ex parte prosecution whether "undue
71 See id. (collecting and categorizing various "excuses for inactivity").
72 See Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 918 (CCPA 1966).
73 See Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 589 (CCPA 1981). As the CCPA in Gould explained:

Gould's testimony taken as a whole does not set forth adequate facts to support a
finding of that continuity of activity which constitutes reasonable diligence.
Merely stating that there were no weeks or months that he "did not work on the
laser" is not enough, absent supporting facts showing specifically what that
"work" consisted of and when it was performed.
Gould, 363 F.2d at 918. See also Kendall v. Searles, 173 F.2d 986 (CCPA 1949), in which
the court observed that:
[t]he testimony of appellant's other corroborating witnesses . . . was of a general
nature to the effect that appellant from the time of his conception worked
continuously on the development of his idea. [This] evidence, which was not
specific as to dates and facts, does not constitute the kind of corroboratory
evidence required to establish appellant's diligence during the critical period.
Id. at 993.
74 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
75 See id. at 67. The Pfaff Court further specified that the second, "ready for patenting" prong
of the on sale test could be satisfied in at least two ways: "by proof of reduction to practice before the
critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other
descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to
practice the invention." Id. at 67-68.
76 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
77 Id. at 17.
78 See id. at 17-18.
79 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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experimentation" would be required to make and use a claimed invention in
accordance with the requirement for an enabling disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1,80 and the court has subsequently approved the application of that multi-factor
analysis in inter partes litigation of invalidity defenses based on allegations of nonenablement. 81 The analytical complexity of these invalidity defenses surely justifies
evidentiary treatment on par with that of the doctrine of equivalents.

(2) Analogous Risk
The Monsanto court's contention that jury resolution of invalidity under a theory
of prior conception coupled with diligence does not suffer a risk analogous to that of a
jury deciding equivalents infringement by overall similarity is similarly not well
taken. The risks of juror confusion and error are equally potent in both settings; in
fact, the potential for societal harm that would result from a jury's mistake in
interpreting whether a party's actions amounted to "diligence" in the § 102(g)(2)
sense is more severe than that which would result from the jury's misinterpretation
of whether two devices are "equivalents" in the doctrine of equivalents sense.
In the former setting, if a jury mistakenly finds infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents by applying an incorrect "overall" similarity analysis, the patentee's
right to exclude the accused infringer will have been extended beyond the literal
boundaries of the patent claims without the safeguard of an element-by-element
analysis that relates the scope of protection awarded to the limitations of the claims.
Such an analysis ensures an acceptable balance between the competing policies of the
notice function of claims and meaningful protection of the inventor's contribution,82
and prevents a court from erasing, "under the guise of applying the doctrine of
equivalents ....
a plethora of meaningful structural and functional limitations of the
claim on which the public is entitled to rely in avoiding infringement." 83 Even though
this public notice policy goal will have been thwarted by the jury's mistaken finding
of liability under the doctrine of equivalents, the immediate and direct impact of the
jury's mistake will be borne only by the defendant accused infringer; the factual
question of infringement by entities other than the defendant must be separately
litigated.
In the latter setting of a challenge to patent validity, if a jury incorrectly
concludes that someone other than the inventor earlier conceived the same invention
and was reasonably diligent in reducing it to practice, the patent is rendered invalid

80 See id. at 737. The court stated that the:
[f]actors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require
undue experimentation ... include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary,
(2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of
working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6)
the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the
art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
Id. (citation omitted).
81 See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Amgen,
Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
82 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30 (1997).
83 Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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and the defendant cannot be held liable for infringement. Nor can any other entity.8 4
In this scenario the unjustified extension of rights will improperly benefit the
accused infringer, and by extension all other competitors in the marketplace of the
invention. In either scenario, valuable property rights will have been improperly
assigned, but the societal impact is far more extensive when the jury's mistake
pertains to the patent's invalidity rather than its enforcement.

(3)'Reasonable"Diligence Determination
The Monsanto court's final justification for its rejection of a "particularized
evidence"/"linking argument" requirement was that a diligence inquiry under Section
102(g) requires that the jury consider whether the prior conceiver's diligence was
"reasonable."8 5 Because "reasonableness" is a typical subject of jury fact-finding in
other types of tort cases such as negligence cases, the Federal Circuit noted,
heightened evidentiary presentation requirements should not be imposed on a patent
86
invalidity defense based on an assertion of reasonable diligence.
This extrapolates much too far. The fact that it is a standard task for juries in
personal injury cases to determine if a person owing a duty of care to another acted
in a "reasonable" manner provides no meaningful prediction of a jury's ability to
determine in a patent invalidity trial if an earlier conceiver's actions in reducing an
invention to practice constituted "reasonable" diligence throughout the required time
period. The argument ignores the requirement that evidence of diligence must be
definite and continuous throughout the relevant time period, in satisfaction of the
public policy that patent law favors early disclosure of new technology and will not
reward a later reducer unless she was first to conceive and continually diligent in
working towards reduction to practice.8 7 The evidence must also clearly show that
the purported diligence activity was directed at reducing to practice the invention of
88
the claims at issue, rather than some other invention.
The fallacy of extrapolating into the patent setting a jury's familiarity with
"reasonableness" determinations in other types of cases is further evidenced by
applying that argument to other invalidity defenses; surely the Monsanto court
would not contend that jury determination of whether a given invention would have
been obvious to a hypothetical "reasonable" person of ordinary skill in the art under
35 U.S.C. § 103 is a "standard task" that juries are equipped to perform without
presentation of evidence and linking argument on each of the Graham v. John Deere

81 See Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(declaring it "undisputed that as a result of collateral estoppel, a judgment of invalidity in one
patent action renders the patent invalid in any later actions based on the same patent") (citing

Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971)).
85 Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1367.
8

See id. at 1367-68 (citing authorities discussing jury determination of "reasonable care" in

negligence cases).

87 See Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 385 n.5 (CCPA 1977).
88 See id. at 385 (stating in interference context that it is "well settled that, to satisfy the
reasonable diligence' requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), the work relied on must ordinarily be
directly related to reduction to practice of the invention of the counts in issue").
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factors. 89

CHOICE OF LAW:
FEDERAL CIRCUIT VERSUS REGIONAL LAW
Although not immediately apparent from the face of the opinion, choice of law
issues directly contributed to the result in Monsanto. In analyzing the patentee's
argument that the invalidity theory of earlier conception coupled with diligence was
not properly before the jury, the Federal Circuit in Monsanto concluded that the
issue was "not unique" to its jurisdiction and that accordingly, it should defer to the
law of the relevant regional circuit, in this case the Third Circuit, because the suit
was tried in the federal district court in Wilmington, Delaware. 90 The Federal
Circuit read the law of the Third Circuit as "not requir[ing] that the defendant
explicitly argue a theory in order for it to be before the jury."91 Rather, the Federal
Circuit viewed Third Circuit precedent as making the jury instructions the
92
"benchmark" of whether a particular issue is before a jury.
The Monsanto court's choice of Third Circuit law allowed it to sidestep the
precedential force of Lear Siegler. There, in contrast with Monsanto, a different
panel of the Federal Circuit had not considered itself constrained by regional circuit
law from finding that a patentee's theory of liability was not properly before the jury,
93
despite the jury's having been properly instructed on that theory.
More broadly, the Monsanto court departed from the apparent trend of recent
Federal Circuit decisions to bring more issues within the ambit of "Federal Circuit
law," even those not "unique" to patent law. When an issue of either substance or
procedure is "intimately related to substantive patent law," 94 the Federal Circuit is
more frequently viewing such issues as not requiring deferral to regional circuit
law. 95 For example, the court has held that a procedural issue that is not itself a
substantive patent law issue is nevertheless governed by Federal Circuit law "if the
issue pertains to patent law, if it bears an essential relationship to matters
committed to our exclusive Uurisdiction] by statute, or if it clearly implicates the
jurisprudential responsibilities of this court in a field within its exclusive
jurisdiction." 96 In this manner the Federal Circuit is building a more robust body of
patent-related precedent and applying its "special expertise" in patent law to a great
array of issues that intersect with patent law. 97 Application of Federal Circuit law to
89 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
90 Monsanto, 261 F.3d at 1363.

91Id. at 1364.
92 Id.
93 See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(following Federal Circuit's decision in Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp., 739 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
91 Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
95See id. at 1564-65 (applying Federal Circuit law to issue of personal jurisdiction).
96 In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, 203 F.3d 800, 803 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Midwest Indus.,
Inc. v. Karavan, 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in relevant part)).
97 Cf Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1564-65 (asserting that the application of Federal Circuit
law to personal jurisdiction issues "would clearly promote judicial efficiency, would be consistent
with our mandate, and would not create undue conflict and confusion at the district court level").
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these issues enables the court to fashion a body of nationally uniform patent and
"patent-intersecting" law, in keeping with the policy rationale underlying the court's
98
formation.
The important issue of jury guidance raised by Monsanto deserves treatment
within Federal Circuit law rather than regional circuit law. Whether the defendant's
evidentiary presentation properly placed the question of earlier conception coupled
with reasonable diligence before the jury is inextricably intertwined with substantive
patent law-i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2), which requires "reasonable diligence," and the
wealth of case law interpreting that requirement. Even if one considers reasonable
diligence as implicated in Monsanto to be a "procedural" issue, it is difficult to
suggest an issue that is not more "intimately" or "essentially" related to the patent
right; the question of whether the reasonable diligence issue was properly before the
jury is completely dispositive of the invalidity of the patent in suit.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit missed a clear opportunity to improve the patent jury trial
process when it declined to require a more particularized and contextualized
evidentiary presentation of the prior invention defense raised in Monsanto. Such a
requirement should be mandated for all patent invalidity defenses tried to juries.
Rather than perpetuate the current two-track system in which infringement is
treated more rigorously, the Federal Circuit should require an evidentiary
presentation by accused infringers asserting invalidity defenses that is no less
particularized than that mandated for patentees asserting infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 99 The risk of jury error is even higher in the invalidity

More generally, see Joan E. Schaffner, FederalCircuit "Choice of Law": Erie Through the Looking
Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1996) (proposing an expanded choice of law regime for the
Federal Circuit in which the court "should exercise independent jurisdiction over all legal issues
that either (1) impact upon the patent-related primary activities of the parties or (2) relate to patent
policy and thus invoke the special expertise of the Federal Circuit").
98 See Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(announcing that Federal Circuit law must be applied to determine whether a commercial offer for
sale has been made within the meaning of the on sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. 102(b), because
permitting patent validity issue to be resolved according to contract laws of relevant state where
offer was made might lead to different patent validity outcomes in different states, a result "clearly
incompatible with a uniform national patent system"). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 38 (1989) (criticizing
Federal Circuit's policy of applying regional circuit law to non-patent-related procedural and
substantive issues as "objectionable from several perspectives"); id. at 59-60 (suggesting that freeing
Federal Circuit from obligation to apply regional circuit law to non-patent issues would "put the
court's experience to better use," facilitate "ability of the CAFC to bring its own expertise to bear on
difficult policy questions," and keep patent law "in the mainstream because of the CAFC's greater
familiarity with nonpatent doctrine and because the CAFC would itself influence the thinking of the
remainder of the federal judiciary").
99 Five judges of the Federal Circuit established the evidentiary requirements set forth in
Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp, 739 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Although five judges do not
constitute an en bane Federal Circuit (unlike the CCPA), it may be appropriate for an expanded
panel, see 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), or even a full en bane court to consider the expansion of the
Nestier/LearSiegler requirements to all invalidity defenses, as proposed herein.
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setting, because in addition to losing on liability the patentee forfeits its patent
property right altogether.
It is within the Federal Circuit's power, and its
responsibility, to chart a clearer course for juries through the perilous straits of
patent invalidity.

